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Abstract
Taxpayers may justify non-compliant behaviour with the perceived high prevalence
(descriptive norm) or high acceptability (injunctive norm) of tax non-compliance in the
population. However, their perception may be distorted: their taxpaying behaviour may
follow misperceived norms and reflect ‘pluralistic ignorance’. In an experimental
questionnaire study focusing on the injunctive norm, psychology students were asked,
in a first step, about their personal tax-related beliefs and behaviour and the perceived
beliefs and behaviour of others. The results confirmed the divergence between average
personal beliefs and perceived beliefs of the average. In a second step, participants were
given feedback about either this divergence or about a norm-irrelevant finding (control).
The intervention significantly improved the perceived tax beliefs of others (injunctive
norm) and, mediated by this effect, increased hypothetical tax compliance. The findings
encourage tax-regulatory measures based on these theoretical considerations.
Misperceptions of social norms about tax compliance (1): A prestudy
Michael Wenzel
Introduction
Many studies on tax evasion have found a significant relationship between one’s own
tax non-compliance and the perceived non-compliance of others (e.g., Bosco & Mittone,
1997; De Juan, Lasheras & Mayo, 1994; Kaplan & Reckers, 1985; Song & Yarbrough,
1978; Webley, Robben & Morris, 1988). Indeed, one common justification for tax
cheating and tax evasion may be that ‘everybody does it’ (Bardach, 1989), which can be
extended to ‘…so why shouldn’t I?’ or ‘…I would feel stupid if I did not do the same’.
In stark contrast to a perceived high prevalence of others’ tax evasion as a justification
for one’s own tax evasion, survey results actually indicate that most people believe in
the necessity of a tax system and everybody’s obligation to pay their fair share. In a
survey on the cash economy (Artcraft Research, 1998) commissioned by the Australian
Taxation Office (Tax Office), people almost unanimously agreed that ‘tax cheats
unfairly shift the burden onto honest taxpayers’ (97% agreed); and they disagreed with
the statement that ‘if you’re not happy with how the government spends your taxes, it’s
OK to hold some of it back by not declaring everything you earn’ (95% disagreed).
Thus according to these results, people personally think one should pay one’s taxes. In
contrast, a substantial portion agreed that ‘most people try and avoid paying their fair
share of tax’ (49% agreed). Thus perceived common practice seems to contradict
personal moral beliefs. Moreover, the results also showed that personal moral beliefs
diverge from those moral convictions ascribed to others. While many respondents
agreed that ‘a lot of people I know think it’s OK not to pay tax on cash earnings’ (46%
agreed), only a fraction agreed that ‘I think it is OK being paid cash for a job and then
not declaring all of it on your tax return’ (8% agreed). To sum up, taxpayers suspect that
a high proportion of taxpayers evade tax and regard this as appropriate behaviour, while
they personally disapprove of such behaviour. This constellation is problematic for two
reasons. First, there is the risk that the misperceived social norm exerts pressure on
people to disregard their personal beliefs and evade tax. Second, for those taxpayers
who themselves would prefer to evade taxes, the high perceived prevalence of tax
evasion provides them with a justification for doing so.
The concept of ‘pluralistic ignorance’ captures the first of these two possible processes.
It refers to the phenomenon that people misattribute other people’s behaviour through
failing to realise that the same social pressure that determines their own behaviour may
also determine the behaviour of others (Miller & McFarland, 1987). With regard to tax
evasion, a perceived high prevalence of tax evasion would be attributed to other
people’s conviction that tax evasion is acceptable, if not appropriate, behaviour. In turn,
this social norm would exert some pressure to conform and evade tax as well. In doing
so, one contributes to the general impression of widespread evasion which others, due to
pluralistic ignorance, again attribute to moral conviction rather than to social pressure.
There is thus a positive feedback loop of misattribution and conformity. An intervention
to increase tax compliance could try to break the feedback loop and give taxpayers
information about the true moral convictions in the taxpayer community (cf. Schroeder
& Prentice, 1998). It could demonstrate the discrepancy between personal beliefs and
beliefs attributed to the collective (pluralistic ignorance) and instigate a reappraisal of
the situation.
The second process does not require the assumption that people themselves personally
object to tax evasion. Rather, it focuses on those who feel inclined to evade tax but may
feel vague social restrictions against actually doing so. Through projecting their own
behaviour and convictions onto the majority of taxpayers, they render their own
behavioural tendency (i.e., tax evasion) as the dominant, normal and socially accepted
act. They perceive a ‘false consensus’ (Marks & Miller, 1987) and thus construct their
own justification for tax evasion and the conviction that they are doing the right thing.
An intervention to increase tax compliance could again inform taxpayers about the true
amount of tax evasion and social approval for it. It would correct taxpayers’ perceptions
and reduce the justifiability of tax evasion.
The intervention would involve, in a first step, surveying a group of taxpayers about
their personal taxpaying beliefs and behaviour as well as their perceptions of other
people’s beliefs and behaviour. In a second step, the respondents would receive
feedback on the results, which would (probably) show a discrepancy between the
aggregated personal beliefs and perceived beliefs of the aggregate (or category) of
taxpayers. These moral beliefs refer to the prescriptive norm of how people should
behave (Cialdini, Kallgren & Reno, 1991), which is probably more relevant to the
pluralistic ignorance process (Schroeder & Prentice, 1998). Alternatively, the taxpayers
would receive, in the second step, information on the aggregated individual (self-
reported) behaviour and the perceived taxpaying behaviour of the aggregate of all
taxpayers. Results would probably show that people overestimate the extent of non-
compliance, in particular when they themselves are not fully compliant. This refers to
the descriptive norm of how people actually behave (Cialdini et al., 1991), which is
probably more relevant to the false consensus process. The effectiveness of the
intervention could be compared with a control group of taxpayers who would not
receive feedback about the results (or feedback about an irrelevant aspect of the results)
and a control group that would not participate in the survey at all (and therefore would
not receive any feedback).
As a preliminary test of the effectiveness of such an approach, an experiment with
student participants was conducted. A student sample was used out of convenience.
Certainly, university students differ in many respects from the population of taxpayers
that would be used later for the actual intervention. However, the preliminary study
tested theoretical predictions about more general psychological processes and there are
no theoretical reasons why students and general taxpayers should differ in terms of
these processes. Thus on a theoretical level the preliminary study was intended to
inform the later intervention and contribute to a theoretical understanding of taxpaying
behaviour, even if we cannot generalise the findings directly to actual taxpaying
behaviour and to a real-life intervention that would differ in many procedural details.
The procedure of this preliminary study indeed allowed for a more detailed analysis of
the underlying processes than would be possible in an evaluation of the actual
intervention. So this study is a necessary complement to the later evaluation of the real-
life intervention.
Study
The study comprised two phases. In a first step, students were asked about their own
beliefs about paying taxes and their own (hypothetical) taxpaying behaviour, as well as
the beliefs and behaviour of other students. In a second step a week later, the students
were given feedback about the findings and asked again, embedded in other questions,
about their own beliefs and the beliefs of others. They were also given taxpaying
scenarios and asked to indicate the degree to which they would be honest and comply
with the Tax Office. In the feedback phase of the experiment, two different conditions
were realised. Participants in the experimental condition received feedback about their
own versus others’ tax-related moral beliefs (injunctive norm). Participants in the
control condition received feedback about an irrelevant aspect that did not have
normative implications for taxpaying behaviour, namely, the degree to which
respondents felt informed about tax issues versus the degree to which they regarded
others to be informed (control). To keep the study simple, it investigated only an
intervention based on perceived injunctive norms; it did not test the impact of feedback
on descriptive norms, that is, one’s own versus others’ taxpaying behaviour.
The predictions were as follows. First, a pattern of pluralistic ignorance (and false
consensus) was predicted. That is (hypothesis 1), respondents will endorse fairness and
honesty in paying taxes to a greater degree than they think others do (injunctive norm)
and will report being more honest and compliant when it comes to paying taxes than
they think others are (descriptive norm). Second, feedback about the injunctive norm
finding should correct the respondents’ misperception of the social (injunctive) norm.
That is (hypothesis 2), the norm-relevant feedback (relative to the irrelevant feedback)
will reduce the perceived discrepancy between respondents and others (pluralistic
ignorance), as respondents will regard others as endorsing fairness and honesty to a
greater degree after receiving feedback compared with before. This correction of the
perceived social norm should lead to more compliant behaviour. That is (hypothesis 3),
respondents in the norm-relevant feedback condition will indicate more compliance in
taxpaying scenarios than respondents in the norm-irrelevant condition. This effect of
feedback on compliance should be due to correction of the perceived social norm. That
is (hypothesis 4), the effect of the feedback manipulation on compliance will be
mediated by the perceived injunctive norm and thus will be significantly reduced if the
effect of the injunctive norm is controlled.
Method
Participants and design
Sixty-four first-year psychology students participated in the study: 44 females and 20
males aged between 17 and 42 years (M = 22). Six participants did not participate in the
second part of the study. For the second part, participants were randomly allocated to
one of four conditions of a 2 x 2 design including the factors Feedback (treatment vs.
control) and Order (self-others vs. others-self). The latter factor was included to control
for an effect of order of self versus other questions in part 1.
Questionnaire part 1
Participants were asked to participate in a questionnaire study on tax issues that would
involve a second part in the following week. In order to be able to combine the
responses from the two parts, participants were first instructed to develop a code
number (based on personal details such as ‘The first letter of your mother’s first name’)
that they would be able to reconstruct a week later. Then they were introduced to the
topic of tax, acknowledging that this might not yet be an issue for them if they did not
earn taxable income, but it soon would be relevant to all of them. The order of the
following questions was varied. In one condition, respondents were first asked: ‘After
you have entered the workforce and are then earning taxable income: What would YOU
think and do?’ This was followed by six questions measuring their belief in honesty
when it comes to tax (e.g., ‘Do you think one should be absolutely honest in one’s tax
returns?’; ‘Do you think cheating in one’s tax return is harmless, like playing a game?’;
all items had a response scale from 1 = not at all, to 7 = very much, unless otherwise
indicated) and four questions measuring their hypothetical taxpaying behaviour (e.g.,
‘Would you be honest in your tax returns?’, ‘Would you overstate tax deductions in
your tax returns?’). Then a second block of questions was introduced with the question:
‘After students have entered the workforce and are then earning taxable income: What
do you think MOST STUDENTS would think and do?’ The same questions as used
before for one’s personal beliefs and behaviour were now phrased in terms of the
perspective of other students (e.g., ‘Do most students think one should be absolutely
honest in one’s tax returns?’). In the other condition of the factor Order, the order of
these two blocks of questions was reversed.
The remainder of the questionnaire was used to pretest some other material that is not
relevant for the present study, except for one question where participants were asked
how well-informed they thought they and other students were about the current tax
reform in Australia (e.g., ‘How much do YOU know about the Tax Reform?’ and ‘How
much do MOST STUDENTS know about the Tax Reform?’). Finally, respondents were
asked to indicate their sex and age.
After respondents had returned the questionnaire, they were asked to indicate on a list
whether or not they had actually earned taxable income beyond the tax-free threshold.
This question should indicate to what extent tax was an issue for these students.
However, it was kept separate and cannot be linked with the data from the actual
questionnaire in order to acknowledge that participants may not want to answer this
question, without affecting their willingness to fill in the questionnaire.
Questionnaire part 2
A week later, the students received another questionnaire that gave them feedback about
the findings from the first part. First, they were instructed to reconstruct their code.
Then they read a page that firstly recapped the earlier questionnaire and secondly
described and graphically illustrated a finding from it. At this stage, the main
manipulation took place. In the treatment condition, respondents were told about the
discrepancy between average personal views and the perceived views of the average
student:
On average, respondents held the strong personal view that one should be honest
in one’s tax matters, should willingly fulfil one’s civic duty to pay taxes and
should not regard tax cheating as a minor offence or a game. In contrast,
respondents thought that most students would hold these same views to a lesser
degree. That is, most students would think honesty, sense of duty and
disapproval of cheating was less important when it comes to paying one’s taxes.
Hence, these results reveal an interesting paradox. The average of all the
personal views that we received sums up what most students actually think, and
this contrasts sharply with what they think most students think. Most students
actually agree that honesty, responsibility and truthfulness are important when
we pay our taxes!
This finding was further illustrated with a bar chart that showed the pattern of means for
the average personal view versus the perceived average view for a selected question.
The graph depicted the true findings for the variable ‘Overstating one’s tax deductions
is acceptable vs. unacceptable’.
In the control condition, participants were informed in the same way about a similar
discrepancy, however, for a presumably norm-irrelevant finding. This finding referred
to the discrepancy between one’s own and others’ knowledgeability concerning tax
reform:
On average, respondents clearly indicated that they knew rather little about the
Tax Reform. In contrast, respondents thought that most students would know
more about the Tax Reform. Hence, these results reveal an interesting paradox.
The average of all the personal views that we received sums up what most
students actually think they know, and this contrasts with what they think most
students know. Most students stated they were not well informed about the new
tax system but assumed others were better informed!
Again, the finding was also illustrated graphically, namely for the item ‘Are you
familiar with Activity Statements? – not at all vs. very much’.
On the following page, first, six questions asked the students to comment on these
findings in both conditions. These questions are not of interest here and were only used
to divert participants from the true purpose of the study. Then, one question asked
respondents again about their and others’ knowledgeability concerning tax (‘Do you
think YOU [MOST STUDENTS] are informed well about tax issues?’) and three
questions asked about their and others’ honesty beliefs and injunctive norms (i.e., a
subset of the six questions used in the first part of the study).
A short description of a scenario followed, where respondents were asked to imagine
they were preparing their tax return and realised they had few deductions to claim.
‘However, you kept a number of receipts for books that were not related to your work or
studies. The short titles on the receipts, though, could give the impression that they
were. You spent about $350 on these books.’ Two questions measured the hypothetical
tendency to falsely claim the expenses as deductions (‘How likely is it that you would
claim deductions on some or all of these expenses?”, 1 = not at all, 7 = very much;
‘How much of these expenses would you claim as work-related expenses?’, 1 = none, 7
= all of them; α = .89) Scale scores were obtained by averaging across these two items.
The remainder of the questionnaire again pre-tested some other material, the details of
which are not relevant to the present study. Respondents were told that the following
questions were part of a different and unrelated study. They were asked to take the role
of a small business owner who had not lodged their tax statement (Business Activity
Statement) and who had received a reminder letter. The respondents answered several
questions about the qualities of the letter before they also were asked how they would
react to the letter. The compliance measure relevant for the present study was: ‘Would
you feel tempted to defy the Tax Office?’
Results
Judging from their comments and willingness to fill in the questionnaire, the students
seemingly related well to the issue of tax. Out of 64 respondents, 32 indicated that they
earned taxable income, while 26 indicated that they did not (six respondents did not
answer this question). Irrespective of their own experience, however, the questions
seemed to be meaningful to them.
Although the present study focused only on the impact of injunctive norms on tax
compliance, it may be of interest whether injunctive and descriptive norms proved to be
empirically distinguishable. A factor analysis for the six items measuring one’s personal
honesty beliefs and the four items measuring personal behaviour yielded one strong
factor (Eigenvalue = 6.64) that accounted for 66% of the variance. The next strongest
factor had an Eigenvalue of only .737 and was therefore ignored. A factor analysis for
the 10 items measuring others’ beliefs and behaviour likewise yielded one strong factor
(Eigenvalue = 5.96), accounting for 60% of the variance. The second largest factor had
an Eigenvalue of .928 and was thus just under the critical level of 1. However, even if
the factor analysis was defined to provide a two-factor solution, the two emerging
factors (accounting for 38% and 31% of variance after rotation, respectively) did not
match the theoretical distinction between injunctive and descriptive norms. The fact that
all items were measured in one block might have contributed to this lack of empirical
differentiation between the two concepts, and further research needs to establish
whether the conceptual distinction between descriptive and injunctive norms is a
meaningful and valuable one in the area of taxation.
A factor analysis for all injunctive items, that is, the six items pertaining to one’s
personal beliefs and the six items pertaining to the beliefs of others, yielded a two-factor
solution. The two factors had Eigenvalues of 6.49 and 1.27 at the point of extraction and
accounted for 33% and 32% of variance after rotation, respectively. The two factors
reflected the expected differentiation between one’s personal beliefs and the perceived
beliefs of others. The six items for one’s personal beliefs and the six items for the
beliefs of others loaded substantially on their respective factor (with loadings > .50)
without substantial cross-loadings (< .50). Likewise, a factor analysis for all eight
behavioural descriptive norm items yielded a two-factor solution. The two factors had
Eigenvalues of 4.91 and 1.20 at the point of extraction and accounted for 41% and 35%
of variance after rotation, respectively. The four items for one’s own behaviour and the
four items for the perceived behaviour of others loaded substantially on their respective
factor (with loadings > .50) without substantial cross-loadings (< .50).
Self-other discrepancies
Despite the lack of empirical differentiation, the distinction between injunctive and
descriptive norms was upheld for tests of self-other discrepancies. Four scale scores
were obtained (i.e., for personal and others’ injunctive and descriptive norms) by
averaging across respective items. An analysis of variance for tax beliefs and behaviour
was performed with the three factors Order, ‘self vs. other’ and ‘injunctive vs.
descriptive norms’; the latter two being within-subject factors. The analysis yielded
three significant main effects. Most importantly, the self and other-ratings differed
significantly, F(1, 62) = 123.31, p < .001. Respondents indicated that their own beliefs
and behaviour reflected more tax honesty and greater tax morality than others’ beliefs
and behaviour (Ms = 5.51 vs.4.19). This effect was not further moderated; it held for the
injunctive and descriptive norm aspect likewise. The other two main effects can be
ignored. First, the main effect of ‘injunctive vs. descriptive’, F(1, 62) = 4.04, p = .049,
should not be interpreted because the measures of injunctive and descriptive norms are
not strictly comparable. Second, the main effect of Order, F(1, 62) = 4.65, p = .035,
reflects that respondents thought their own and others’ beliefs and behaviour showed
greater tax morality when they were asked to rate others’ beliefs and behaviour first
followed by their own, rather than vice versa (Ms = 5.14 vs. 4.56). This result is most
likely to reflect an anchoring effect: the perspective respondents described first
determined the part of the rating scale they used to indicate a difference between self
and others. This main effect is also not theoretically substantial and can be ignored.
More important and crucial is the finding that, as predicted, respondents differentiated
sharply between their own beliefs and behaviour and the beliefs and behaviour they
expected of others. They indicated that they personally believed that one should be
honest in one’s tax dealings (and that they would act likewise), whereas other students
would endorse such beliefs to a lesser degree and find tax cheating more acceptable.
This result was crucial for the second part of the study, when this finding was reported
back to the students and described as a paradox that would imply that their view of
other students’ beliefs and behaviour needed to be corrected.
Changing injunctive norms
The intervention of the present study focused on injunctive norms. Furthermore,
because the respondents should not be alerted to the fact that the study involved a pre-
post measure and that the feedback constituted an intervention in between, only three of
the injunctive norm items were repeated in the second part of the survey, embedded in a
number of other items. Therefore, only the same three injunctive norm measures from
parts 1 and 2 were considered for the pre-post analysis. These three measures had
sufficient reliabilities comparable between the two parts (self: αs = .84 and .82; others:
αs = .75 and .86, for parts 1 and 2 respectively). Moreover, the conceptual distinction
between one’s own and others’ beliefs was again corroborated on the basis of the data
from part 2. A factor analysis that was set to extract two factors (initial Eigenvalues =
3.66 and .95; explained variance after rotation = 39% and 38%, respectively) provided a
clear separation between self and other-items. Self and other-items loaded substantially
on one factor each (loadings > .70) without any substantial cross-loadings (< .40). Scale
scores for personal and others’ injunctive norms were obtained by averaging across
respective items.
Following hypothesis 2, it was tested whether the norm-feedback intervention
significantly improved the perception of the social norm. An analysis of variance for the
perceived injunctive norms of others was performed with the between-subjects factors
Order and Feedback (treatment vs. control) and the within-subjects factor ‘pre vs. post-
treatment’. The analysis yielded three significant effects. First, there was a main effect
of Pre-post, F(1, 54) = 5.12, p = .028; it reflected that respondents perceived the social
norm to be more positive at the second than the first measurement point (Ms = 4.52 vs.
4.19). However, this effect was moderated by two two-way interactions. The less
interesting one is the interaction between Pre-post and Order, F(1, 54) = 6.33, p = .015;
the order effect at Time 1 (Ms = 3.83 vs. 4.53) disappeared at Time 2 (Ms = 4.55 vs.
4.52). It is trivial that the order of items at Time 1 did not have an impact anymore at
Time 2. More interesting, however, is the interaction between Pre-post and Feedback,
F(1, 54) = 4.80, p = .033, as it confirmed the prediction. In the treatment condition,
where relevant normative feedback was given, the perceived injunctive norms of others
became more positive (M = 4.14 vs. 4.80), t(28) = 2.72, p = .011. In contrast, in the
control condition, where the feedback was normatively irrelevant, the perceived
injunctive norm remained constant (M = 4.24 vs. 4.24), t(28) = .00, ns. The intervention
successfully increased the perception that most other people think one should be honest
and truthful in one’s tax returns.1
Influencing taxpaying behaviour
The intervention thus influenced perceived social norms, but did it also affect
(hypothetical) tax compliance? Two measures were available to test for such an effect.
First, there was a hypothetical scenario of having the opportunity to incorrectly claim
expenses as deductions, which followed immediately after the injunctive norm post-
measure. Second, presumably as part of an unrelated questionnaire and set in a different
context, participants were instructed to take the role of a small business owner who
received a reminder letter and were asked whether they would defy the Tax Office.
First, the deduction measure was subjected to an analysis of variance with the factors
Feedback and Order. The analysis yielded a main effect of Feedback, F(1, 54) = 4.39, p
= .041, in line with hypothesis 3. Compared to the control condition, the norm feedback
significantly increased hypothetical compliance (Ms = 4.10 vs. 5.07). Second, the
defiance measure was subjected to an analysis of variance with the factors Feedback,
Order and Letter Quality. The latter factor referred to three kinds of reminder letters that
were pre-tested in this study; the factor is not relevant for the present study, however, it
was included and controlled for. The analysis yielded exclusively a marginally
significant main effect of Feedback, F(1, 54) = 2.97, p = .092, again in line with the
prediction. Compared to the control condition, respondents in the normative feedback
condition indicated that they would comply more and defy the Tax Office less (Ms =
5.21 vs. 5.83).
                                                
1 Further analyses showed that this effect on perceived social norms did not significantly reduce the self-
other discrepancy. An analysis of variance with the factors Order, Feedback (treatment vs. control), ‘self
vs. other’ and ‘pre vs. post-treatment’ yielded a non-significant three-way interaction effect of Self-other,
Feedback and Pre-post, F(1, 54) = 2.42, p = .125, even though there was a visible trend.
Hypothesis 4 predicted that an effect of the intervention on tax compliance would be
due to its effect on the perceived social norm. In order to test for this mediation
hypothesis, the same analyses for the two compliance measures were run again, but this
time the perceived social norm was included as a covariate. If the effects on compliance
were mediated by the perceived social norm, the covariate should have a significant
effect and the effect of the intervention should be substantially reduced. The analysis for
the deduction measure revealed a significant effect of the covariate, the perceived social
norm, F(1, 53) = 7.10, p = .010. The effect of Feedback was now non-significant, F(1,
53) = 2.21, ns. Likewise, the analysis for the defiance measure yielded a significant
effect of the covariate, F(1, 53) = 6.03, p = .018, and there was no longer an effect of
Feedback, F(1, 53) = 1.39, ns.
Discussion
The present research yielded good evidence for an approach to tax compliance in terms
of misperceived social norms and suggests that interventions designed to correct such
perceptions would be a promising approach to increase tax compliance. Respondents
held much more positive beliefs about the obligation to pay taxes and to be honest in
one’s tax dealings than they thought others did. Certainly, respondents might be
motivated to hold this view as it reflects positively on them. However, whatever the
underlying motivation, the importance of this study is in showing that there is an
apparent contradiction between average personal beliefs and perceived beliefs of
average others; and respondents can be confronted with this contradiction with
subsequent effects on their behaviour.
The pattern reflects a pluralistic ignorance (Miller & Prentice, 1994; Prentice & Miller,
1993) that may have destructive effects. ‘I personally think one should be honest, but
everybody else cheats on taxes, so why shouldn’t I? I would be stupid if I did not do the
same.’ Not only is there an overestimation of others’ non-compliance but also the belief
that others hold normative beliefs consistent with their behaviour. In fact, the concept of
pluralistic ignorance refers to the underestimation of social pressure that others might
experience, neglecting the possibility that they cheat on taxes out of conformity with the
social pressure rather than out of personal immorality. So, another more abstract self-
other discrepancy is essential to the concept, namely the view that others act in the way
they do because they think it is right, while one acts ‘only’ out of conformity with
others’ (social) norms. The destructive force lies in the perpetuation of the misperceived
social norm through one’s behaviour, because everybody is an ‘other’ for others and
thus one’s own behaviour contributes to their misperceptions of the social norm.
The present study demonstrated that this cycle can be broken. Respondents who were
given feedback about the paradox affecting average personal beliefs and perceived
beliefs of the average other person significantly changed their perception of the social
norm and perceived others to hold more moral beliefs about paying taxes. Furthermore,
in line with the assumption that respondents would follow and conform to some extent
with the perceived social norm, the feedback intervention also changed respondents’
hypothetical behaviour and increased their compliance. We empirically demonstrated
that this effect was mediated by perceptions of the social injunctive norms that others
were more moral in their beliefs about taxpaying than previously assumed.
We can thus draw three important conclusions from the present research. First, social
norms seem to matter in the area of taxation and affect taxpaying behaviour. Second,
taxpayers may misperceive these social norms and underestimate others’ beliefs in the
obligation to pay one’s taxes honestly. Third, an intervention that gives taxpayers
feedback about this phenomenon may be effective in correcting perceptions of social
norms and increase the degree to which others are perceived to endorse beliefs of tax
honesty. In this way, the intervention can increase tax compliance.
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